

# Mathematics and Finance: End of the Bubble?

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24 April 2009

# Plan

- 1 Subprime Crisis
- 2 Financial Innovation
- 3 Some historical facts
- 4 Mathematics for quantitative finance
- 5 Model calibration and inverse problem
- 6 Incomplete Markets, Risk-Measures

# Subprime crisis I


- the **excesses** of the finance industry are dragging down the whole economy.
- **Credit crunch** was based on subprime risks, a lowering of underwriting standards that drew people into mortgages.
- **Diffusion** of the home mortgage crisis in any financial places through securization via MBS
- **Mortgage-backed securities** (MBS) depend of the performance of hundreds of mortgages.

# Subprime delinquency rates


400 billions dollars in 2004 to 1 400 billions in 2007

## US mortgage markets


Subprime delinquency rates<sup>1</sup>



MBS issuance<sup>2</sup>



ABX tranche spreads<sup>3</sup>




<sup>1</sup> Mortgage delinquency rates (60+ days) by cohort year, in per cent. Number of months of seasoning plotted on the horizontal axis.

<sup>2</sup> In trillions of US dollars; for 2007, first three quarters. <sup>3</sup> JPMorgan Chase home equity (ABX.HE 2007-1) closing on-the-run spreads, in basis points.

# Credit Spreads Indices

## Credit spread indices



<sup>1</sup> Five-year on-the-run CDS mid-spread, in basis points. <sup>2</sup> Index spreads for five-year CDSs on syndicated US loans. <sup>3</sup> Index spreads for BBB tranches of commercial mortgage-backed securities (index series 2 and 3).

Source: JPMorgan Chase.

Graph 1

# Delinquency practices I

- **Lapses** in the evaluation of MBS and their derivatives by **rating agencies** and investor
- Many of these securities received a “**good**”**rating**, and their returns were significantly greater than comparable rated bond
- The practice of “**rating arbitrage**” getting better-than merited rating and selling securities based on that rating was born.
- Investors in MBS were assured to have a AAA asset, and suddenly find that the MBS is a **junkbonds**
- In complete absence of **prudential regulation** and **oversight** (Mr. Greenspan)

# Don't Blame the Quants I

said **Steve Shreve**, in ([Forbes.com](#), the 10.08.08)

- S.Shreve is Maths Professor at Carnegie Mellon University, and responsible of a Master Program in Quantitative Finance.
- Students become **Quants**= Quantitative people (PhD's in Math or Physic) in Investment Banks.

## The Blames

- People argue that **without quants models**, these complicated MBS might not have been created.
- It is **only partially true**, since it arrives that financial products are sold, before to have a good pricing model

# Don't Blame the Quants II

- Even if the growth of credit derivatives market was exceptional, it was not the same for the quantitative research in the aera
- Nevertheless, quants have produced models to price such derivatives, (often with limitations on their use),
- and they have to assume this responsibility in the crisis
- even their are not **decision- makers**
- even their are not **designer** of derivatives securities



# Quantitative Finance : Three Pillars I

## Practice

- Financial innovation
- Pricing
- Risk management

## Mathematics

- Continuous Time Finance
- Stochastic Calculus
- Risk measure

## Numerical implementation

- Modelling
- Calibration
- Risk management in Practice

# An Historical Example : paper currency |


from William Poole, (Pres.Fed Saint Louis)

- the starting point was **goldsmith receipts** accepted as a medium of the exchange
- **benefit** : economy on the use of gold, and encourage economic activity and trade
- **source of instability** : when some bankers issued too many notes against the gold they had.
- **panic and lose of confidence**
- **inflation** When governments issued a lot of currency.


Since 1914, Governments have **never abandoned paper currency**, and try to **control inflation**, by mandating price stability as an objective for monetary policy

# Deregulation and Fluctuations

**Deregulation** (1970) would not have been possible without helping economic agents to manage their financial risks.



# Dinars/US, Year 2006




# Forward contract I

**Financial Innovation** : by allowing economic agents to made financial operations in the **future** at today fixed price,

- **forward and futur contract**, that obligated one counterpart to buy and the other to sell a fixe amount of securities at an agreed date in the future  $T$ .
- future contract are the standardized version of forward contract by clearinghouses, or new market
- used as a **protection** again large movement of the market
- **swap contracts** are some extension of forward contract to a series of cash flows at specified date in the future (interest-rates, currency)
- Based on new technology, **computer**


# IRS Forward 2007-2008



# Definition (Options Contract)

Call (Put) Options are simply

- the **right**, but not the **obligation**,
- to buy (sell) something in the future
- at **given price** called = exercise price = strike price =  $K$







# Definition

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## Les options d'achat et de vente

Les payoffs (ou valeur à maturité en  $T$ ) sont des options en fonction du prix du sous-jacent  $S_T$





# Market Risk Industry

More than \$20 trillions in notional each year

- **contracts** (futures, options, swaps), or more complex options : Barrier options, Asian options, American options .
- Various underlying : stocks, currencies, interest rates, commodities... called **basic securities**


## New non financial supports

- **Credit derivatives**
- New markets and their derivatives : catastrophe bonds, energy and weather derivatives, CO<sub>2</sub>-market.

# OTC Derivatives 99-2007, Bis Report

## Positions in OTC derivatives markets

In trillions of US dollars<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> All figures are adjusted for double-counting. <sup>2</sup> Single currency contracts only.

Source: BIS Triennial Survey.

Graph 4

# Pricing and Hedging Problem

- Pricing Problem

What is the price of these contracts ? It depends on the (uncertain) future values of underlying.

- Hedging Problem

From the opening in 1973 of the first derivatives market in Chicago (CBOT)

How to reduce the exposure of the option's seller ?

- Different risk for buyer or seller


- The buyer exposure is the premium = option price
- The seller exposure may be very large  $(X_T - K)^+$

Both problems have to be considered together.

# Trend and Price fluctuations

## CAC40/SP500, 2005-2008

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# European Indices

CAC40+FTSE, 96-08

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# Louis Bachelier I

Surprisingly, the starting point of financial risk industry expansion is

- **Brownian motion theory** (Einstein (1905), Wiener(1913), Levy (1930), Itô (1940..))
- and **Itô's stochastic calculus**

first introduced in 1900 in his PhD's Thesis "**Théorie de la Spéculation**" by the French Mathematician

## The Mathematician Louis Bachelier

before

- Paul Appel, President
- Henri Poincaré, Examiner and Director
- Joseph Boussinesq, Examiner

Louis Bachelier Jeune



# The Black & Scholes Paradigm of Zero-Risk


- Black, Scholes and Merton showed in 1973 that the option's seller may deliver the contract at maturity **without incurring any residual risk**, by using a **dynamic trading strategy**.
- **Forward contract can be replicated by static strategy, without any model**
- The **B&S formula** (giving the price and the hedge of Call options) was **implemented** in the CBOT a few months later.
- This **totally new economic idea** was rewarded by the **Nobel price** (1997).
- But, it did not prevent **Long Term Capital Market's** from **Bankruptcy**(1998)(Another story).




# A Dynamic Uncertain World

- Uncertainty is modelled via a family  $\Omega$  of scenarios  $\omega$ , the possible ( **continuous**) trajectories of the asset prices,  $X_t(\omega) = \omega(t)$ .

Example, Brownian motion paths



# 2D Brownian motion



Thanks to J.F Colonna (Ecole Polytechnique)

# Stochastic Calculus

- By assumption, the paths have a **finite continuous quadratic variation** :  $(D_n)$ =the sequence of dyadic partitions).

$$[X]_t(\omega) = \lim_n \sum_{t_i \leq t, t_i \in D_n} (X_{t_{i+1}} - X_{t_i})^2$$

## Itô's formula

$$\begin{aligned} f(t, X_t)(\omega) &= f(0, x_0) + \int_0^t f'_x(s, X_s)(\omega) dX_s(\omega) \\ &+ \int_0^t f'_t(s, X_s)(\omega) dt + \int_0^t \frac{1}{2} f''_{xx}(s, X_s)(\omega) d[X]_s(\omega) \end{aligned}$$

The last integrals are well defined as **Lebesgue-Stieljes** integrals.

The first integral exists as Itô's integral, defined as limit of **non-anticipating** Riemann sums, (where we put  $\delta_t = F'_x(t, X_t)$ ),

$$\sum_{t_i \leq t, t_i \in D_n} \delta_{t_i}(\omega)(X_{t_{i+1}} - X_{t_i})(\omega).$$

From a **financial point of view**, the Itô's integral is the cumulative **gain process** of trading strategies :

- $\delta_t$  is the number of the shares held at time  $t$
- the increment in the Riemann sum is the price variation over the period.
- the **non-anticipating** assumption corresponds to the financial requirement that the investment decisions are based only on the past prices observations.

# Self-financing Portfolios I

The residual wealth of the trader is invested only in cash, with a yield rate (called short rate)  $r_t$  by time unit.

The **self-financing condition** states that the wealth increment is only generated by : - the gain due to the risky investment  $\delta_t dX_t$   
- the interest due to the residual wealth  $V_t - \delta_t X_t$

$$dV_t = r_t(V_t - \delta_t X_t)dt + \delta_t dX_t = r_t V_t dt + \delta_t (dX_t - r_t X_t dt), \quad V_0 = z$$

## About the information structure

In the B&S framework, the strategy  $\delta_t$  is only based on today's prices  $\delta_t = \delta(t, X_t)$ . This makes reference to the **hypothesis of market efficiency** : all available market information is reflected in today's prices.

# Hedging Derivatives : a Solvable Target Problem I

- Let us consider a trader **having to pay** the pay-off  $\phi(X_T)(\omega)$  in the scenario  $\omega$ ,  $((X_T(\omega) - K)^+$  for a Call option) at time  $T$ .
- This target may be **hedged**(approached) in all scenarios by the wealth generated by a self-financing portfolio, solving

## Backward Stochastic Differential Equation

$$dV_t = r_t(V_t - \delta_t X_t)dt + \delta_t dX_t = r_t V_t dt + \delta_t (dX_t - r_t X_t dt), \quad V_T = \phi(X_T)$$

- The **“miraculous” message** in the world of Black and Scholes is that a **perfect hedge** is possible and easily computable.


# Hedging Derivatives : a Solvable Target Problem II

- **Pricing rule** *The price at time  $t$  of the derivative is the Value of the hedging portfolio* : otherwise it is possible to make profit without bearing any risk.
- Such strategy, **an arbitrage**, is prohibited in a liquid market. So, no Arbitrage implies **Price Uniqueness**

## Call(50,50) : Hedging portfolio of Call

- blue= asset path
- red= portfolio value, green= portfolio's risky part


simulation of stochastic phenomena:  $Y(t)$



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
simulation of stochastic phenomena:  $z(t)$



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
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# Call(50,70) : Hedging portfolio of Call


simulation of stochastic phenomena:  $Y(t)$



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

simulation of stochastic phenomena:  $z(t)$



up

more

Close



# Pricing Partial Differential Equation

Assume quadratic variation satisfying :

$$d[X]_t(\omega) = \sigma^2(t, X_t(\omega)) X_t^2(\omega) dt.$$

The function  $\sigma^2(t, X_t(\omega))$  is a key parameter called **local volatility**.

## Theorem (Pricing and hedging)

*Let  $u$  be a regular solution of Pricing PDE*

$$u'_t(t, x) + \frac{1}{2} u''_{xx}(t, x) x^2 \sigma^2(t, x) + u'_x(t, x) x r - u(t, x) r = 0, \quad u(T, x) = \dots$$

*$u(t, X_t)$  is the option price at time  $t$  and the hedging portfolio is given by*

$$\delta(t, X_t) = u'_x(t, X_t)$$

# Pricing Kernel

- Let  $q(t, x, T, y)$  be the Pricing PDE's **fundamental solution**
- The pricing rule becomes :  $u(t, x) = \int h(y)q(t, x, T, y)dy$ .  $q$  is also called **pricing kernel**.

## Risk-neutral Pricing

With some additional assumptions, there exists a  $\mathbb{P}$  equivalent probability measure  $\mathbb{Q}$ , called the **risk neutral probability** s.t.

$$u(t, x, T) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}} \left[ h(X_T) | X_t = x \right]$$

- The function  $\sigma(t, x) = \sigma_t$  is called the **volatility function** function,
- Useful representation for **Monte Carlo simulation**

# Black and Scholes Formula

## For deterministic volatility

- There exists a **closed formula** for Call option prices, the famous **B&S Formula**.

$$C_{BS}(t, x, K, T, \sigma) = x N(d_1) - Ke^{-r(T-t)} N(d_0)$$

$$d_0 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2(T-t)}} \ln\left[\frac{x}{Ke^{-r(T-t)}}\right] - \frac{1}{2}\sigma\sqrt{T-t}$$

$$d_1 = d_0 + \sigma\sqrt{T-t}$$

where  $N(\cdot)$  is the cumulative function of the **normal distribution**.

- The **hedging portfolio** is based on  $\Delta_t = N(d_1)$  risky assets.

# Classical Framework and Market Trend


Following **Bachelier**, asset price dynamics are driven by a **Brownian motion** (BM) via **Stochastic Differential Equation** (SDE)

$$dX_t = X_t(\mu(t, X_t)dt + \sigma(t, X_t)dW_t), \quad X_{t_0} = x_0$$

$W$  may be viewed as a standardized Gaussian noise.

- The **local expected return**  $\mu(t, X_t)$  is a trend parameter appearing for the first time in our propose.  
*That is key point in financial risk management* : Call prices do not depend on the **market trend**.
- It seems surprising, since the first motivation of this financial product is to **hedge** the purchaser against **increases in the underlying prices**.
- By using a **dynamic hedging** strategy, the trader (seller) is also protected against an **unfavorable** evolution.

# Euro and Yen against Dollar



# Options on New Underlying and Statistics I

The most reliable data are **historical data**. The different steps of the calibration are the following

- Modelling the underlying, for instance as Markov diffusion
- Using statistical procedures to **estimate** diffusion parameters, trend and volatility
- Solving the Pricing PDE to deduce price and hedge
- or Using Monte Carlo Methods

# Options on New Underlying and Statistics II

- However, traders are hesitant to use **historical estimators** : they argue that financial markets are not “**statistically stationary**” and that the **past is not sufficient** to explain the future.
- In general, in this context it is not necessary to use sophisticated statistical methods because the spread bid-ask is very large.



# Liquid Market and Implied Volatility I

Organized Markets : CBOT, NYSE, LIFE, MATIF, Currencies....

## Implied Volatility

- When possible, traders use the **additional information** given by the **quoted option prices**
- translate it into volatility parametrization via the B&S formula.
- The **implied volatility**,  $\Sigma^{imp}$  is defined as :

$$C^{obs}(T, K) = C^{BS}(t_0, x_0, T, K, \Sigma^{imp})$$


# Implied Volatility (2)

## Operational motivations


- Every day after the market closing, traders have to evaluate their portfolio with a model fitted by quoted prices .
- The option hedge portfolio is easily computed by  $\Delta^{imp} = \partial_x C^{BS}(t_0, x_0, T, K, \Sigma^{imp})$ .
- This strategy is used **dynamically**, by defining the implied volatility and the associated  $\Delta$  at any renegotiation date.

# Implied Volatility and Smile


## Implied Volatility Surface/ SP500



# Average Volatility Surface/Dax



# French Index Volatility



Source données : Monep - traitement C. Thibierge

# Implied Volatility Surface : An Ill-posed Inverse Problem

Unfortunately, the option market is typically limited to relatively **few different options**, and a naive interpolation yields to irregularity and instability of the local volatility .

## Calibrating local volatility

- Finding the local volatility is a **non-linear** problem of **function approximation** from a **finite data set**.
- Given that data are solutions at time  $(t_0, x_0)$  of Pricing PDE, **ill-posed inverse Problem** tools provide **robust** solutions.
- Difficulties due to the non  $\mathcal{C}^2$  regularity of the call function
- Managing **Model Risk** in place of **Market risk**

# An example : Osher's optimization program

Osher (1996) looks for a **regular** local volatility  $\sigma(t, x)$ .

- Prices adjustment is made through a **least square minimization** program,
- including a **penalization term** related to the local volatility regularity.

$$J(\alpha, \sigma) = \sum_{i,j} \omega_{i,j} (f(t_0, x_0, \phi_{i,j}, T_i, \sigma) - C_{i,j}^{Obs})^2 + \alpha \|\nabla \sigma\|^2 \rightarrow \min_{\sigma}$$

- Existence and uniqueness are only partially solved

## Asymptotic Behavior

Using **Large Deviation Theory**, Beresticky, Buscat (2001)

$$\Sigma^{\text{implied}}(K, t_0)^{-1} = \ln\left(\frac{K}{x_0}\right)^{-1} \int_{x_0}^K \frac{d\xi}{\xi \sigma(\xi, t_0)}$$

# Options on Several Assets I

## Main objectif

- Option prices on every component are assumed to be calibrated from the data.
- Given the risk neutral cumulative function of the asset  $i$ ,  $F_i(x)$  and the fact that  $F_i(X_T^i)$  is uniformly distributed, the problem may be reduced to work on  $[0, 1]^n$

**Static point of view** Def A copula is the cumulative distribution function of a measure on  $[0, 1]^n$  with uniform marginal distributions.

- Non parametric problem, very complicated to calibrate
- Market uses in general Gaussian copula with few parameters (only the **correlation** if  $n = 2$ )


Quid of the dynamic hedging ?




# Stock Volatility During the crisis

## Equity market volatility and valuations

Implied volatility<sup>1</sup>



Risk tolerance<sup>3</sup>



12-month forward P/E ratio<sup>5</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Annualised volatility implied by the price of at-the-money call option contracts on stock market indices; monthly averages, in per cent. <sup>2</sup> Based on S&P 500; prior to 1990, based on S&P 100. <sup>3</sup> Derived from the differences between two distributions of returns, one implied by option prices, the other based on actual returns estimated from historical data; weekly averages of daily data. <sup>4</sup> First principal component of risk tolerance indicators for the S&P 500, DAX 30 and FTSE 100. <sup>5</sup> Ratio of the stock price and 12-month forward earnings per share.

Sources: Bloomberg; I/B/E/S; BIS calculations.

Graph VI.12

# Value At Risk I

When it is not possible to replicate some pay-off, (incomplete market) the trader has to measure his market residual risk exposure.

- The traditional measure is the variance of the replicating error. But a new criterion, taking into account extreme events, is now used.
- The VaR criterion, corresponding to the maximal level of losses acceptable with a given probability (95%), has taken considerable importance for several years.

$$VaR_{\epsilon}(X) = \inf \{k : \mathbb{P}(X + k < 0) \leq \epsilon\}.$$

# Value At Risk II

- Regulation Authorities have required a **daily VaR** computation of the **global risk portfolio** from financial institutions. Such a measure affects the reserve a bank has to hold to face market risks.
- Processes with **heavy tail** distributions (Lévy processes with non-continuous paths) are now used in portfolio optimization and stress-testing.

# Daily VaR on a aggregated portfolio



# Among Strategic Mathematics Problem

- Renewed interest in Levy processes
- Renewed interest in fractional Brownian motion
- Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
- Optional decomposition of supermartingale
- Coherent and convex risk measures
- Change of numéraire and market models for interest rates
- Evolution of the yield curve on a manifold
- Monte Carlo methods for prices and their derivatives, since prices are also given as expectation
- Monte Carlo methods for American options and controlled problems, by using non linear BSDE's

# Why these methods do not prevent the crisis ?

- In credit derivatives market, only static models were used, too simple
- In incomplete market, it is difficult to estimate the residual risk
- **Daily risk management**, by delta hedging or value at risk has to be completed by different indicators relative to different time scales
- Liquidity risk in particular are not captured
- counterparty risk is minimized
- systemic risk has been undervalued
- Other indicators, as the size of the positions (2000 Billions of subprime) exist outside of math's criterium.

# Demand for technology

- Wall street is exploring the use of graphics processing units found in video games to speed up options analytic and other math-intensive applications
- All developments in Monte Carlo simulation are made efficient by the new power of computer
- New developments in [algorithmic trading](#), where engine is used to place trades using an electronic order book

# Demand for people

- First master's programs in quantitative finance were founded fewer than 15 years ago (in Paris in 1990)
- Approximately 75 quantitative finance programs worldwide, (approx 2.000 quants students graduate annually...)(100 in Paris VI Master's Program)
- More diversified jobs : in regulation, insurance and accounting firms... in today's distressed market



# Market are not like physical systems

At least three common behaviors cannot be with (simple) maths :

- Intentionality of human actions/reactions
- Subjective notion of risk
- Strategic Behaviors
- Asymmetric information

So **Game theory** for example is to be taken into consideration, which is **practically** more difficult to deal with.

# Conclusion

The end of a bubble : yes ! but not the end of mathematics in finance.

- Mathematicians bring rigor to the party, and rigor is a critical part of quantitative finance, and risk management
- More demand for quantitative risk management
- Technology evolves quickly in Financial markets

Still remember that in social sciences there are not truly reproducible situations. So maths can only yield to partial representation of the complex reality

# APPENDIX

## Monetary Risk Measure

# Monetary Convex Risk Measure I

Academics have debated on the VaR **significance** as a **risk measure**.

For instance, its **non sub-additive** property enables banks to play with the creation of subsidiaries. (Revision on the criterion ?)

# Monetary Convex Risk Measure II

## Definition (Characterization of Risk Measure)

The functional  $\rho$  is a **convex risk measure** if it satisfies the following properties :

- 1 **Convexity** and Decreasing monotonicity]
- 2 **Translation invariance** :  $\forall m \in \mathbb{R}, \quad \rho(X + m) = \rho(X) - m$ .  
 "+ technical property of decreasing continuity from below to work with probability measures later (dual representation) :  $\Psi_n \nearrow \Psi \implies \rho(\Psi_n) \searrow \rho(\Psi)$ .
- 3 **Coherent** :  $\forall \lambda > 0, \quad \rho(\lambda X) = \lambda \rho(X)$ .

# Duality and penalty function I

The convexity of the framework leads to an "explicit" representation in terms of scenarii (Delbaen, Foellmer-Schied)

## Theorem

There exists a *penalty function*  $\alpha$  taking values in  $\mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$  s.t.

$$\forall \Psi \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \rho(\Psi) = \sup_{Q \in \mathcal{M}_{1,f}} \{ \mathbb{E}_Q(-\Psi) - \alpha(Q) \}$$

$$\forall Q \in \mathcal{M}_{1,f}, \quad \alpha(Q) = \sup_{\Psi \in \mathcal{X}} \{ \mathbb{E}_Q(-\Psi) - \rho(\Psi) \}$$

## Example (Entropic risk measure)

$$e_\gamma(X) = \gamma \mathbb{E} \left( \exp \left( -\frac{1}{\gamma} X \right) \right) = \sup_{Q \in \mathcal{M}_1} \left( \mathbb{E}_Q(-X) - \gamma h(Q|\mathbb{P}) \right)$$

where  $h$  is the **entropic function**

$$h(Q|\mathbb{P}) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}} \left( \frac{dQ}{d\mathbb{P}} \ln \left[ \frac{dQ}{d\mathbb{P}} \right] \right)$$

if  $Q \ll \mathbb{P}$ ,  $+\infty$  otherwise